This note extends the single-unit-demand results of Liu and Pycia (2011) to the responsive-preferences and multiple-unit-demand framework of Pycia (2011a). * We would like to thank Andrew Atkeson and William Zame.
Introduction
In Liu and Pycia (2011) , we studied the canonical model of assignment without transfers, with single-unit demands, and showed that in large markets all sensible, symmetric, and asymptotically strategy-proof ordinal allocation mechanisms coincide asymptotically, and that ordinal efficiency is obtained in the limit. The equivalence was built on a surprising finite-market result: the ordinally-efficient and envy-free allocation is unique and coincides with the outcome of Probabilistic Serial, provided the agents' preference profile has full support. We also gave an easy-to-verify condition for asymptotic ordinal efficiency. In the present note we extend the single-unit demand results to the responsive-preferences and multiple-unit-demand framework of Pycia (2011a) ; the sequencing of results is the same as in our main paper on the subject, Liu and Pycia (2011) .
1
We study assignment of both divisible and indivisible goods.
Model
We study the responsive-preferences model introduced by Pycia (2011a) . A finite economy consists of a finite set of agents N , a finite set of object types Θ (or simply objects), and a finite set of object copies O.
2 Each copy o ∈ O has a uniquely determined type θ (o) ∈ Θ. To avoid trivialities, we assume that each object is represented by at least one copy.
Agents have multiple-unit demands. For each agent i ∈ I let F i be the set of feasible consumptions of agent i. We assume that each F i is compact. We simultaneously study two variants of multiple-unit assignment:
Divisible goods: fractional consumption is allowed, F i ⊂ R |Θ| + , and we assume that
1 Please see Liu and Pycia (2011) for a detailed discussion of the background of the results. In this our earlier paper we remarked in Conclusion that our results remain valid in a multiple-unit demand setting; the present note provides the (straightforward) details behind this assertion.
2 We consider both indivisible and divisible goods; in the divisible case we allow fractional copies.
if a profile (k a ) a∈Θ of quantities of goods θ ∈ Θ is feasible then so is any profile (k a ) a∈Θ such that 0 ≤ k a ≤ k a , a ∈ Θ. Indivisible goods: only integer consumption is allowed, F i ⊂ N |Θ| , and we assume that if a profile (k a ) a∈Θ of quantities of goods θ ∈ Θ is feasible then so is any profile (k a ) a∈Θ such that k a = 0, 1, ..., k a , a ∈ Θ. Denote by F = {F i |i ∈ N } the class of feasible structures in the economy. In the indivisible case, we denote byF i lotteries over feasible consumptions of agent i; in the divisible case, denoteF i = F i . A (random) allocation µ specifies the expected quantities µ (i, a) ≥ 0 of good a assigned to agent i. In the divisible case randomization may be used, but is not needed; µ might entail randomization in the indivisible case.
3 All allocations studied in this paper are assumed to be feasible in that i∈N µ (i, a) ≤ θ −1 (a) for every a ∈ Θ, µ (i, ·) ∈F i for every i ∈ N.
The set of these random allocations is denoted by M.
In some results we impose a further assumption -which we call agent-specific capacities -that each agent i ∈ N is endowed with capacity K i > 0 and an allocation µ (i, ·) is feasible if, and only if, a∈Θ µ (i, a) ≤ K i . In words, an allocation is feasible if i consume K i units, or less.
4 Feasibility structures satisfying agent-specific capacities have been examined in Hatfield (2009 ), Kojima, 2009 , Kasajima (2009 ), and Heo (2011b .
3 When goods are indivisible an allocation needs to be implemented as a lottery over deterministic allocations; a deterministic allocation is a one-to-one mapping from agents to copies of objects from O. Since we cover both assignment of divisible and indivisible goods, we do not take a stance on whether the possibly random assignment can be decomposed. To assure decomposability one can additionally impose the decomposability conditions from Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2011) (cf. also Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) ).
4 Theorem 3 and half of Theorem 1, as well as Remarks 1,2 and 3 do not rely on this assumption, but Theorems 2 and 4, and half of Theorem 1 rely on it. The agent-specific-capacities assumption fails in many settings of interest, such as course allocation; see, among others, Sönmez and Ünver (2010) ; Budish and Cantillon (2010) ; Budish (2010) .
Each agent i ∈ N has preferences S i over allocations inF i . We assume that the preferences are responsive -in first order stochastic dominance sense -with respect to a strict preference relation i over objects from Θ. To define the responsiveness formally, let us say that
and the dominance is strict (> FOSD ) if one of the equalities is strict.
Preferences are responsive if
A related concept of responsive preferences has been well-studied in matching (c.f. Roth, 1985) , but has not been explored in studies of object allocation. An example of such a responsive preference structure is when agents' demands are determined by additively separable von Neumann -Morgenstern utility functions; such additively separable environments have been studied by Hatfield (2009 ), Kojima, 2009 , Kasajima (2009 ), and Heo (2011b .
Agents' preferences over objects define their preferences over copies of objects:
agent i prefers object copy o over object copy o iff she prefers θ (o) over θ (o ), and the agent is indifferent between two object copies if they are of the same type. We can thus interchangeably talk about preferences over object types and preferences over object copies, or simply about preferences over objects. The indifference also implies that we can interchangeably talk about allocating objects and allocating copies of objects. We refer to the set of preference rankings (an agent's types) as P and to the set of preference profiles as P N .
We assume that Θ contains the null object ("outside option"), and we assume that it is not scarce: to simplify exposition let us assume that agents have bounded demands, and that |θ −1 ()| is so large that even if all agents are at capacity, is still available. An object is called acceptable if it is preferred to .
Agent's i feasibility structure F i and his preference ranking i over objects are referred to as the type of the agent.
A mechanism φ : P N → M is a mapping from the set of profiles of preferences over objects that agents report to the set of allocations.
A Characterization of Ordinal Efficiency and EnvyFreeness
In this section we simultaneously characterize the celebrated Probabilistic Serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) , and two natural properties of allocations: ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness. 5 Given preference profile N , a random allocation µ ordinally dominates another random allocation µ if for every agent i the distribution µ (i, ·) first order stochastically dominates µ (i, ·), that is
A random allocation is ordinally efficient with respect to a preference profile N if it is not ordinally dominated by any other feasible allocation. Ordinal efficiency is a weak and natural efficiency requirement: if an allocation is not ordinarily efficient, then all agents would ex ante agree there is a better one. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) discuss this requirement in depth.
Given preference profile N , an allocation µ is envy-free if for any two agents i, j ∈ N and any allocationμ (i, ·)
When there is only one feasibility structure, F, this concept is equivalent to the standard concept of first order stochastic dominance envy-freeness. The first order stochastic dominance comparison is well-funded in our context because agents' preferences over allocations are responsive. Envy-freeness (referred to also as no envy) is a strong fairness requirement introduced by Foley (1967) .
Probabilistic Serial
Probabilistic Serial treats copies of an object type as a pool of probability shares of the object type. Given preference profile N , the random allocation produced by Probabilistic Serial can be determined through an "eating" procedure in which each agent "eats" probability share of the best acceptable and available object with speed 1 at every time t ∈ [0, 1]; an object a is available at time t if its initial endowment θ −1 (a) is larger than the sum of shares that have been eaten by time t.
Formally, at time t = 0, the total quantity of available shares of object type a ∈ Θ is Q a (0) = |θ −1 (a)|, and for times t ∈ [0, ∞) we define the set of available objects A (t) ⊆ Θ and the available quantity Q a (t) of probability shares of object a ∈ Θ through the following system of integral equations. To formulate the equations we say that agent i eats from object a at time t iff a ∈ A (t) and ∀b ∈ A (t) a i b, and
The system of integral equations is:
where the Boolean function χ (statement) takes value 1 if the statement is true and 0 otherwise. If stopped at time t, the eating procedure allocates object a ∈ Θ to agent i ∈ N with probability ψ
given by the eating procedure stopped at the time no agent eats from any object any
The continuity of the functions Q a implies that for any time T ∈ [0, 1) and any η > 0 sufficiently small, any agent i eats the same object for all t ∈ [T, T + η).
In the eating procedure there are some critical times when one or more objects get exhausted. At this time some of the available quantity functions Q a have kinks; at other times their slope is constant. 
Main Finite-Market Results
Our goal is to show that ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness fully characterize the allocation of Probabilistic Serial. To do so we restrict attention to preference profiles with full support. A preference profile has full support if each agent type (,
F is represented in the profile. 7 The restriction to full-support preference profiles is strong in small markets, however as the market becomes large the restriction becomes mild.
Theorem 1. If the preference profile has full support and the feasibility structure satisfies agent-specific capacities, then an allocation is ordinally efficient and envyfree if and only if it is generated by Probabilistic Serial.
Ordinal-efficiency and envy-freeness of Probabilistic Serial were first proved by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) , and extended to our setting by Pycia (2011a).
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The converse implication has been proved by Liu and Pycia (2011) for single-unit demands, and their proof directly extends to our case. 9 We provide another proof, based on the ideas in Pycia (2011a,b) .
Proof. Let t a be the constants from Proposition 2 in Pycia (2011a) . Rename the objects so that
Our assumptions uniquely determine the 0 − 1 matrix indexed by i and a where a cell equals 1 iff µ (i, a) = 0. Indeed, if i ranks a 1 first then no-envy implies that µ (i, a 1 ) = min (t a 1 , K i ) = 0; if i ranks a second or lower, then ordinal efficiency and full support imply that µ (i, a 1 ) = 0. The rest of the matrix is determined similarly, by induction.
Define A 1 (k) = {i| i ranks a 1 first and µ (i, a 1 ) = 0, and k = K i }. Given the above matrix, ordinal efficiency implies that t a 1 = max k∈F k or is implicitly given by
Proceeding in this way, by induction, we pin down all values t a , thus uniquely determining the allocation µ. By Proposition 1 in Pycia (2011a), the allocation thus 8 As shown in Pycia (2011a) , this implication does not rely on the assumption of agent-specific capacities.
9 We just need to replace time 1 by time K = max i∈N K i , and reinterpret probability as quantity. Heo (2011a) elegantly simplified Liu and Pycia (2011) 's proofs of this result and of related Theorem 2; her simplification remains valid in the multi-unit demand environment.
coincides with Probabilistic Serial.
The latter implication relies on the preference profile having full support; there are non-full-support preference profiles for which the converse implication fails -see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) (c.f. also Example 2 from Kesten, Kurino, and Ünver (2011) ).
Allocations in Large Markets
The characterization of efficient and fair allocations given by Theorem 1 holds true in any finite market, including large markets. Ordinal efficiency is a natural requirement, and envy-freeness is an attractive property of allocations; however these requirements are very strong -there are many sensible allocation mechanisms that do not satisfy them. The goal of this section is to show that much weaker requirements -asymptotic ordinal efficiency and asymptotic envy-freeness -are sufficient to determine the allocation as the market becomes large.
To achieve this goal let us fix a sequence of finite economies N q , Θ, O=1,2,... in which the set of object types, Θ, and the set of feasibility structures F are fixed while the set of agents N q grows in q; we will assume throughout that |N q | → ∞ as q → ∞.
We also assume that the proportion of agents endowed with each feasibility structure F i ∈ F is above some lower bound η > 0 that does not depend on q. This assumption is trivially satisfied if F contains only one feasibility structure.
To avoid repetition, in the sequel we refer to N q , Θ, O q as the q-economy, and maintain a notational assumption that allocations µ q and mechanisms φ q are defined on q-economies. The q-economy function mapping object copies to their types is denoted θ q . The set of random allocations in the q-economy is denoted M q .
Notice that we do not impose any assumptions on the sequence of sets of object copies, O q , except for some remarks where we explicitly impose the additional
Our main results apply equally well regardless of whether the number of object copies stays bounded, or whether it grows slower than, faster than, or at the same rate as the number of agents in the economy. In particular, replica economies in which the number of agents and the number of object copies grow at the same rate are a special case of our setting, as is the environment studied by Che and Kojima (2010) who assume that the ratio θ −1 q (a) / |N q | converges to a positive limit for all non-null objects a ∈ Θ.
Asymptotic Ordinal Efficiency
Liu and Pycia (2011) introduced the following concept of asymptotic ordinal efficiency, based on an auxiliary concept of -ordinal efficiency. For simplicity of exposition let us define it only for environments that satisfy agent-specific capacities.
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Given an > 0, we say that a random allocation µ is -ordinally efficient with respect to a preference profile iff (i) no agent is allocated a higher-than-probability of an unacceptable object, (ii) if object a is unallocated with probability higher than and µ (i, b) > , then b i a, and (iii) there is no cycle of agents i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n and objects a 0 , a 1 , ..., a n such that µ (i k , a k ) > and a k+1 i k a k (all subscripts modulo n + 1).
Given a sequence of preference profiles Nq , a sequence of allocations µ q is asymptotically ordinally efficient if for each q = 1, 2, ... there is (q) > 0 such that (q) → 0 when q → ∞ and µ q is (q)-ordinally efficient with respect to N q . We say that the hold true: (i') no agent is allocated a positive probability of an unacceptable object,
(ii') if object a is unallocated with positive probability and µ (i, b) > 0, then b i a, and (iii') there is no cycle of agents i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n and objects a 0 , a 1 , ..., a n such that
Asymptotic Envy-Freeness
To formulate our main result on allocations in large market, we need to relax envyfreeness to asymptotic envy-freeness. Fix a sequence of preference profiles Nq . A sequence of random allocations µ q is asymptotically envy-free if
We say that the asymptotic envy-freeness of allocations obtains uniformly on a class of sequences of allocations if the lim inf convergence obtains uniformly on this class.
Of course, any sequence of envy-free allocations is asymptotically envy-free. 
Asymptotic Full Support
We derive our first asymptotic results for sequences of preference profiles that have full support in the limit; in Section 5 we relax this assumption.
13 Following Liu and
Pycia (2011), we say that a sequence of preference-profiles Nq has asymptotically full support if there exists δ > 0 andq such that for any q >q, and for any agent type (, F i ) ∈ P × F, the proportion of agents whose Nq -ranking agrees with (, F i ) is 11 Condition (i') is known as individual rationality, and condition (ii') as non-wastefulness. Analogues of all of our results remain true if we strengthen the concept of asymptotic ordinal efficiency by substituting the more demanding conditions (i') and (ii') for conditions (i) and (ii). No change in the results and proofs is needed, except for Theorem 4 when we need to impose some additional assumption such as ex post Pareto efficiency (defined in Section 6), or directly conditions (i') and (ii'). All mechanisms we explicitly discuss in this paper, including those listed in Remark 3, satisfy conditions (i') and (ii').
12 Asymptotic envy-freeness was studied by Jackson and Kremer (2007) . 13 The restriction to asymptotic full-support preference profiles is not needed if the allocations are generated by mechanisms satisfying a mild asymptotic continuity assumption. above δ. Asymptotic full support holds true uniformly on a class of preference profiles if they have asymptotic full support with the same δ andq.
Asymptotic full support means that, as q grows, any preference ranking is represented by a non-vanishing fraction of agents.
14 Because a full-support profile can have a single agent of any given type, there are sequences of full-support profiles which are not asymptotically full-support. However, full-support sequences of preference profiles are asymptotically generic; Liu and Pycia (2011) formally defined asymptotic genericity and proved that asymptotically full-support preference profiles are asymptotically generic.
Main Result on Allocations in Large Markets
The above concepts allow us to state our main result on allocations in large markets:
Theorem 2. Assume the feasibility structure satisfies agent-specific capacities, and fix a sequence of preference profiles Nq with asymptotically full-support. If two sequences of allocations µ q and µ q are each asymptotically ordinally efficient and asymptotically envy-free then they asymptotically coincide, that is,
In the sequel we rely on a slightly stronger version of this result: 
∈ Q ,
14 In a continuum economy, the counterpart of asymptotic full support says that every ordering is represented with positive probability; in other words the distribution of orderings has full support. Our results on asymptotically full-support profiles remain valid if the assumption of non-vanishing representation is imposed only for ranking of objects in which all non-null objects are acceptable.
are each uniformly asymptotic ordinally efficient and asymptotic envy-free, then the asymptotic convergence of the allocation sequences is uniform, that is,
The proof below extends the argument from Pycia (2011b) (the original argument in Liu and Pycia, 2011 can also be straightforwardly extended).
Proof. Let be small relative to the lowest capacity min k∈F k. Fix an economy far enough in the sequence so that it is -envy-free and -ordinally-efficient. Let t a be the constants defined in Proposition 3 of Pycia (2011a) . We can rename the objects so that
Our assumptions uniquely determine the 0 − 1 matrix indexed by i and a when a cell is 1 iff µ (i, a) > . Indeed, if i ranks a 1 first then -envy-freeness implies
> ; if i ranks a second or lower, then -ordinal efficiency and full support imply that µ (i, a 1 ) ≤ . The rest of the matrix is determined similarly, by induction.
Denote A 1 (k) = {i| iranks a 1 first and µ (i, a 1 ) > and K i = k}. Given the above matrix, -ordinal efficiency implies that either t a 1 is -close to 1 (and the lemma is true), or
In the latter case,
Proceeding similarly through (at most) |Θ| steps of induction, we pin down all values t a , and hence pin down all µ (i, a) up to some M (η, |Θ|) . The bound is uniform if all assumptions are imposed uniformly. QED Using a mild asymptotic continuity assumption, in Section 5 we relax the restriction to asymptotically full-support preference profiles. Note also that an analogue of Theorem 2 holds true in environments in which all objects are acceptable.
Allocation Mechanisms in Large Markets
In this section we move beyond studying allocations for single preference profiles (and subsets of profiles), and study mechanisms φ q : P Nq → M q . We first show that asymptotic envy-freeness is a mild requirement, and then derive analogues of our results for all preference profiles, rather than only asymptotically full-support profiles.
Symmetric and Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
How strong an assumption is asymptotic envy-freeness? Liu and Pycia (2011) showed that it is surprisingly mild in single-unit demand setting, and we extend this insight to multiple-unit demands.
Symmetry is a basic fairness property of an allocation, and is also known as equal treatment of equals. When there is only one feasibility structure, |F| = 1, we say that a random allocation µ is symmetric, given a preference profile N , if any two agents i and j who submitted the same ranking of objects, i = j , are allocated the same distributions over objects, µ (i, ·) = µ (j, ·). This motivates our definition in the general case, when there are potentially many feasibility structures.
Given a preference profile N , random allocation µ is symmetric, if whenever agent i submitted the same ranking of objects as agent j, and they both rank objects
Our results will in fact rely only on an asymptotic form of this assumption. Given a preference profile N an allocation is -symmetric if whenever agent i submitted the same ranking of objects as agent j, and they both rank objects a 1 i,j a 2 i,j
... i,j a |Θ| , then i is allocated the distribution µ (i, ·) such that |µ (i, a 1 ) − µ (j, a 1 )| is within of the minimum among µ (i, ·) ∈F i , among distributions satisfying this constraint |µ (i, a 2 ) − µ (j, a 2 )| is within of the minimum, etc. Given a sequence of preference profiles Nq , a sequence of allocations is asymptotically symmetric if for each q = 1, 2, ... there is (q) > 0 such that (q) → 0 when q → ∞ and µ q is (q)-symmetric with respect to N q . Asymptotic symmetry obtains uniformly on a class of sequences of allocations if the convergence is uniform on this class. Of course, every sequence of symmetric allocations is asymptotically symmetric.
Before defining asymptotic strategy-proofness, let us review the standard definition of strategy-proofness of random ordinal mechanism (cf. Gibbard 1977) . A random mechanism φ is strategy-proof if for any agent i ∈ N and any profile of preferences N −{i} submitted by other agents, the allocation agent i obtains by reporting the truth, φ i , N −{i} (i, ·), first-order stochastically dominates allocation the agent can get by reporting anther preference ranking
A sequence of random mechanisms φ q is asymptotically strategy-proof on a sequence of preference profiles Nq if
We say that asymptotic strategy-proofness obtains uniformly on a class of sequences of preference profiles if the lim inf convergence obtains uniformly on this class. A sequence of mechanisms is asymptotically strategy-proof if the convergence obtains uniformly on the class of all sequences of preference profiles.
To show that asymptotic envy-freeness is implied by symmetry and asymptotic strategy-proofness, we restrict attention to mechanism satisfying a regularity condition known as asymptotic non-atomicity. A sequence of random mechanisms φ q :
N q → M q is asymptotically non-atomic on a sequence of preference profiles Nq if
We say that asymptotic non-atomicity obtains uniformly on a class of sequences of preference profiles if the convergence obtains uniformly on this class. A sequence of mechanisms is asymptotically non-atomic if the convergence obtains uniformly on the class of all sequences of preference profiles.
In words, a sequence of random mechanisms is asymptotically non-atomic if the impact on allocations of other agents from a preference change by one agent vanishes as the economy grows. Asymptotic non-atomicity is a natural regularity condition -as markets grow we expect individuals' impact on allocations of other agents to become arbitrarily small; see Debreu and Scarf (1963) and Aumann (1964) .
Remark 1. Asymptotic non-atomicity of Probabilistic Serial is straightforward. Random Priority is asymptotically non-atomic for asymptotically full-support preference profiles. To allocate objects, Random Priority first draws an ordering of agents from a uniform distribution over orderings, and then allocates the first agent her most preferred feasible allocation, then allocates the second agent his most preferred feasible allocation (drawing on objects that that still has unallocated copies), etc. (see Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1998 for seminal work on Random Priority). The proof that Random Priority is asymptotically non-atomic is the same as in Liu and Pycia (2011) .
It is straightforward to observe that in large asymptotically non-atomic markets, symmetry and strategy-proofness are equivalent to asymptotic envy-freeness.
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Theorem 3. For any asymptotically non-atomic sequence of random mechanisms φ q , the mechanisms are asymptotically symmetric and asymptotically strategy-proof if and only if they are asymptotically envy-free.
This result and the above discussion allow us to conclude that asymptotic envyfreeness is a mild assumption. Theorems 2 and 3 furthermore imply Corollary 1. Assume the feasibility structure satisfies agent-specific capacities and that two sequences of random mechanisms φ q and φ q are each (i) asymptotically nonatomic, (ii) asymptotically ordinally efficient, and (iii) either asymptotically envyfree, or asymptotically symmetric and asymptotically strategy-proof. If a sequence of preference profiles Nq has asymptotically full-support, then the sequences of allocations φ q Nq and φ q Nq asymptotically coincide, that is
As in Liu and Pycia (2011) , we will later see that -in addition to Probabilistic Serial -Random Priority, and many other mechanisms satisfy the conditions of this equivalence result.
Analogues of the above two results are true when formulated uniformly on any class of sequences of preference profiles Nq , and resulting sequences of allocations φ q Nq .
15 We apply the efficiency and no envy terms directly to mechanisms: a sequence of mechanisms is asymptotically ordinally efficient if the mechanisms generate asymptotically ordinally efficient allocations for every sequence of preference profiles; similarly, a sequence of mechanisms is asymptotically envy-free if the mechanisms generate asymptotically envy-free allocations for every sequence of preference profiles.
Main Results on Allocation Mechanisms in Large Markets
Results of Section 4 are derived for asymptotically full-support sequences of preference profiles. The analogues of these results are true for all preference profiles if we impose mild continuity assumptions on the mechanisms.
A sequence of mechanisms φ q is asymptotically equicontinuous if for every > 0, and every q large enough, there is δ > 0 such that for every agent j ∈ N q the inequality
is satisfied for all Nq , Nq ∈ P Nq such that
Asymptotic equicontinuity is stronger than asymptotic non-atomicity. It is an asymptotic and ordinal counterpart of the uniform equicontinuity of Kalai (2004) .
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Continuity of large market allocation has been studied by Hurwicz (1979) and Dubey, Mas-Colell, and Shubik (1980) . Champsaur and Laroque (1982) directly address the need for such an assumption.
Remark 2. Asymptotic equicontinuity of Probabilistic Serial is straightforward to demonstrate. Random Priority is asymptotically equicontinuous provided θ
The proof is the same as in Liu and Pycia (2011) .
Imposing asymptotic equicontinuity allows us to extend the claim of Theorem 2 to all sequences of preference profiles.
Imposing the asymptotic equicontinuity assumption allows us to derive our main equivalence results for allocation mechanisms in large markets.
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Corollary 2. Assume the feasibility structure satisfies agent-specific capacities, and that the sequences of random mechanisms φ q and φ q are (i) asymptotically equicontinuous, (ii) asymptotically ordinally efficient, and (iii) either asymptotically envy-free, or asymptotically symmetric and asymptotically strategy-proof. Then, the sequences of mechanisms coincide asymptotically and uniformly across all preference profiles, that is
To be able to apply this equivalence result we need to know which mechanisms -other than Probabilistic Serial -are asymptotically ordinally efficient. We explore this question in the next section.
6 Ex-Post Pareto Efficiency And Asymptotic Ordinal Efficiency Che and Kojima (2010) and Liu and Pycia (2011) showed that -with single-unit demands -Random Priority is ordinally efficient when the number of copies of each object grows to infinity. In this section we extend the general criterion for asymptotic ordinal efficiency to multi-unit demands.
As in Liu and Pycia (2011) let us say that a sequence of allocations can be implemented in a Pareto-efficient and asymptotically-uncorrelated way if the allocations can be implemented as lotteries over Pareto-efficient deterministic allocations in such 17 An analogue of this corollary, with the same proof, holds true holds true uniformly on any class of sequences of preference profiles, Q q ⊆ P Nq . We may then relax the equicontinuity assumption by restricting it to Nq ∈ Q q (rather than all Nq ∈ P Nq ).
a way that random allocations of agents with identical preferences are asymptotically uncorrelated. Formally, a sequence of allocations µ q can be implemented in a Pareto-efficient and asymptotically-uncorrelated way if there exists a probability
space Ω such that conditional allocations µ q (·, ·|ω) for ω ∈ Ω are deterministic and Pareto efficient, and for any a ∈ Θ the maximum over i, j ∈ N q with the same preference type of the covariance of random variables X i:q : Ω ω → µ q (i, a|ω) and X j:q : Ω ω → µ q (j, a|ω) goes to 0 as q → ∞. The first part of this assumption -that µ q (·, ·|ω) are deterministic and Pareto efficient -is known as ex-post Pareto efficiency.
Remark 3. Any sequence of allocations generated by Random Priority on a fullsupport preference profile has Pareto-efficient and asymptotically-uncorrelated implementation. The argument is the same as in Liu and Pycia (2011) .
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Theorem 4. Assume the feasibility structure satisfies agent-specific capacities. If a sequence of symmetric mechanisms φ q is asymptotically equicontinuous, and random allocations φ q Nq can be implemented in Pareto-efficient and asymptotically uncorrelated way for any Nq ∈ P Nq with asymptotically full-support, then mechanisms φ q are asymptotically ordinally efficient.
The proof of this theorem relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Assume the feasibility structure satisfies agent-specific capacities, and fix a sequence of preference profiles Nq with asymptotically full-support. If a sequence of symmetric random allocations µ q can be implemented in Pareto-efficient and asymptotically uncorrelated way, then it is asymptotically ordinally efficient.
This lemma is of independent interest as it shows that asymptotic ordinal efficiency obtains on asymptotically full-support profiles (an asymptotically generic class of profiles) even if the asymptotic equicontinuity assumption is violated.
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The proofs of the lemma and of the theorem are the same as in Liu and Pycia (2011) .
Theorem 4 and Remarks 2 and 3 allow us to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section: all the mechanisms listed are asymptotically ordinally efficient as long as the number of copies of objects is unbounded as the economy grows (with no further assumption on the rate of growth).
Let us finish by noting the following direct corollary of Theorem 4 and 2:
Corollary 3. Assume the feasibility structure satisfies agent-specific capacities. All asymptotically equicontinuous sequences of symmetric and asymptotically strategyproof mechanisms φ q such that random allocations φ q Nq can be implemented in
Pareto-efficient and asymptotically uncorrelated way for any Nq ∈ P Nq with asymptotically full-support, coincide asymptotically.
This corollary phrases the conditions for convergence in easy-to-verify terms.
Conclusion
In Liu and Pycia (2011), we established asymptotic equivalence of a broad class of mechanisms that include Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority. 20 We have shown that all these mechanisms are symmetric, asymptotically ordinally efficient, and asymptotically strategy-proof (and also asymptotically envy-free). In large markets, the choice among these mechanisms need to be based on criteria other than efficiency or fairness. We remarked in Conclusion that the results remain valid in the multiple-unit assignment setting. The present note's role has been to explicate this comment.
19 A uniform analogue of the lemma holds true, see Liu and Pycia (2011) . 20 The equivalence class established by Liu and Pycia (2011) includes also such mechanisms as symmetric randomization over Pápai (2000) Hierarchical Exchange, and Pycia and Ünver (2009) Trading Cycles, extended to the setting with copies by Pycia and Ünver (2011) .
